Previous eye tracking research on the allocation of attention to social information by individuals with autism spectrum disorders is equivocal and may be in part a consequence of variation in stimuli …

We argue that Schilbach et al. have neglected an important part of the social neuroscience literature involving participants in social interactions. We also clarify some part of the models the authors…

Language is a social act. We have previously argued that language remains embedded in sociality because the motivation to communicate exists only within a social context. Schilbach et al. underscore t…

Schilbach et al. contribute to neuroscience methodology through drawing on insights from the second-person approach. We suggest that they could further contribute to social neuroscience by more fully …

We resist Schilbach et al.'s characterization of the "social perception" approach to social cognition as a "spectator theory" of other minds. We show how the social perception view acknowledges the cr…

Although we fundamentally agree with Schilbach et al., we argue here that there is still some residual utility for non-interactive scenarios in social neuroscience. They may be useful to quantify indi…

Schilbach et al. contrast second-person and third-person approaches to social neuroscience. We discuss relations between second-person and first-person approaches, arguing that they cannot be studied …

Schilbach et al.'s model assumes that the ability to "experience" minds is already present in human infants and therefore falls foul of the very intellectualist problems it attempts to avoid. We propo…

Advancing second-person neuroscience will need strong theories, as well as the new methods detailed by Schilbach et al. I assess computational theories, enactive theories, and cognitive/information pr…

In the target article, Schilbach et al. defend a "second-person neuroscience" perspective that focuses on the neural basis of social cognition during live, ongoing interactions between individuals. We…

Though it draws on the grammatical metaphor of person (first, third, second) in terms of representations, Schilbach et al.'s target article does not consider an orthogonal line of evidence for the cen…

People often hold extreme political attitudes about complex policies. We hypothesized that people typically know less about such policies than they think they do (the illusion of explanatory depth) an…