Veille Scientifique étudiante concernant la cognition partagée (SharedCognition) et la polarisation politique
Alimenté par : Claudia Dapino Ponel, Madeline Desmurs
Cette application est une plateforme collaborative de veille scientifique permettant d'importer des publications depuis PubMed, de suivre leur lecture, d'en extraire les éléments méthodologiques clés (protocole, variables, résultats), et de constituer une synthèse structurée pour faciliter la réalisation de revues de littérature.
Dernière synchronisation : 11/06/2026
This commentary responds to Kamp et al. (Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci 275:2199-2201, 2025) editorial on understanding differences across minds in social interaction. It fully supports their relat…
Scientists have long been fascinated by the complexity of eukaryotic transcription and the large numbers of proteins involved at each step in the process. In this issue of Cell, Schilbach et al. bring…
Recognizing actions of others across the whole visual field is required for social interactions. In a previous study, we have shown that recognition is very good even when life-size avatars who were f…
Social interactions are, by their nature, dynamic and reciprocal - your behaviour affects my behaviour, which affects your behaviour in return. However, until recently, the field of social cognitive n…
We argue that Schilbach et al. have neglected an important part of the social neuroscience literature involving participants in social interactions. We also clarify some part of the models the authors…
We resist Schilbach et al.'s characterization of the "social perception" approach to social cognition as a "spectator theory" of other minds. We show how the social perception view acknowledges the cr…
Although we fundamentally agree with Schilbach et al., we argue here that there is still some residual utility for non-interactive scenarios in social neuroscience. They may be useful to quantify indi…
Schilbach et al. contrast second-person and third-person approaches to social neuroscience. We discuss relations between second-person and first-person approaches, arguing that they cannot be studied …
Schilbach et al.'s model assumes that the ability to "experience" minds is already present in human infants and therefore falls foul of the very intellectualist problems it attempts to avoid. We propo…
Advancing second-person neuroscience will need strong theories, as well as the new methods detailed by Schilbach et al. I assess computational theories, enactive theories, and cognitive/information pr…
In the target article, Schilbach et al. defend a "second-person neuroscience" perspective that focuses on the neural basis of social cognition during live, ongoing interactions between individuals. We…
Though it draws on the grammatical metaphor of person (first, third, second) in terms of representations, Schilbach et al.'s target article does not consider an orthogonal line of evidence for the cen…